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''Criminal Procedure, the Burger

CHAPTER 5

Court, and the Legacy of the
Warren Court''*
JEROLD H. ISRAEL**

Richard Nixon's criticism of the Warren Court during the 1968
presidential campaign centered largely on the Court's handling of cases
involving criminal rights. According to candidate Nixon, the Court had
gone much too far. It had twisted the Constitution to serve its own
purposes, created a maze of legal technicalities that worked only to
frustrate legitimate law enforcement efforts, and so weakened "the
peace forces as against the criminal forces in this country" as to be
largely responsible for the sharp rise in crime that had occurred in the
sixties.
What had to be done, continued Nixon, was to appoint persons
to the federal bench "who will interpret the Constitution strictly and
fairly and objectively." Such "strict constructionist" judges could be
expected not only to put and end to the creation of further legal
rights for the accused, but might even trim back on some of the Warren
Court "excesses." Decisions such as Mapp

v.

Ohio ( 1961), prohibiting

the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's
stricture against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and Miranda

v.

Arizona (I 966), requiring the police to inform suspects of their con
stitutional rights before beginning any questioning were frequently
cited by Nixon as examples of the type of decisions that should not
have been made.

* Copyright ©1977 Michigan Law Review. Reprinted by permission. This article is excerpted
and printed without footnotes from the Michigan Law Review, Volume 75, pp. 1319-1425.
** Professor of Law, Univeristy of Michigan Law School.
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Nixon was not the only critic of Mapp and Miranda. Even certain
supporters of the Warren Court had admitted that Mapp and Miranda
were among the Court's "self-inflicted wounds." Miranda, for one
thing, read more like a piece of legislation than a judicial opinion and
Mapp recalled only too well Justice Cardozo's famous query: "Is the
criminal to go free because the constable has blundered?"
Despite Nixon's victory in 1968 and his appointment of four
justices to the Supreme Court, Mapp and Miranda have not been
overruled.
The way in which they have survived and the manner in which the
Burger Court has responded to other questions of criminal law and
procequre give us another insight into the Burger Court.
The following excerpts are from a lengthy article by University
of Michigan Law Professor Jerold H. Israel comparing the Burger
and Warren Courts. The selection that follows focuses on his com
mentary on the Burger Court.
During the 1960s, the Warren Court's decisions in lhe field of criminal
procedure were strongly denounced by many prosecutors, police officers, and
conservative politicians. Some of these critics were careful in their description
of the Warren Court's record. Others let their strong opposition to several of the
Court's more highly publicized decisions destroy their perception of the Court's
work as a whole. They chaiacter.\]:ed the Court's record in terms that can only
be described as grossly exaggerated. They accused the Warren Court of ignoring
totally the "balanced approach" to criminal procedure that had been taken by
its predecessor, the Vinson Court. They claimed that the Warren Court's decisions
were concerned only with the protection of the suspect. The Court had ignored,
they argued, the fact that encroachment upon liberty could come from two sources;
while the government interferes with our liberty when it misuses its law enforce
ment authority, as the Warren Court's opinions constantly noted, criminals also
interfere with our liberty when they commit crimes that deprive us of life, liberty,
and property. The Warren Court, the critics asserted, in seeking to deter govern
mental violations of individual liberty, had failed to give any weight to society's
need to combat effectively this criminal element that poses an even greater danger
to individual liberty. As a result, the critics claimed, the Warren Court had con
tinuously imposed new limitations on police and prosecutors that had handcuffed
those law enforcement officials in their efforts to control crime.
While there may have been some cause for the basic concerns of these critics,
they so overstated their case as to create a grossly inaccurate and unfair image of
the Warren Court. Fortunately, various civil libertarians, particularly those in
academe, sought to set the record straight. They did not necessarily defend the
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Court. Indeed, many expressed concern over the quality of the Court's opinions.
But they stressed that the critics had greatly exaggerated the extent of the Warren
Court's departure from past precedent. The Court had not consistently ignored
precedent; indeed, many of its decisions simply built upon past decisions. Neither
had the Warren Court decisions looked solely to safeguarding the rights of the
accused. The critics had ignored various decisions in which the Warren Court
had accepted as constitutional the expansion of police authority to permit more
effective law enforcement. Moreover, many of the "liberal" decisions cited by
the critics were the product of a doctrinal shift that was related to individual
rights generally and not just to the interests of the accused.
Today the tide has turned. The Court of the 1970's-the Burger Court-also is
being denounced by various commentators, but now the challenge comes from the
civil libertarians. Again some of the critics present a fair portrayal of the Court's
record. But others are showing that gross exaggeration is a quality that can be
shared by criticisms coming from both sides of the political spectrum. As with the
Warren Court critics, many of the Burger Court critics are claiming that the Court
has discarded precedent and tradition and has looked to only one aspect of the
criminal justice process. They portray the Burger Court as steadily rejecting or
"whittling down" the great civil libertarian advances of the Warren Court. They
contend that the Burger Court is substituting narrow, technical interpretations
of constitutional guarantees for the expansive interpretations of those guarantees
adopted by the Warren Court. The current Supreme Court, they argue, shows
only a "law and order" orientation-an interest in promoting the enforcement
of the law without regard to protecting the rights of the accused. As they see it,
the Burger Court has brought the criminal law revoluation of the 1960s to a
halt and has, indeed, started a counterrevolution.
Criticism of this type appears to me to be as overstated as was much of the
criticism of the Warren Court. The record indicates that the Burger Court has not
undermined most of the basic accomplishments of the Warren Court in protecting
civil liberties; neither has the Burger Court consistently ignored the interests of the
accused. The current critics fail, I believe, to put in proper perspective what the
Warren Court did and what the Burger Court has done (or even threatens to do).
Certainly, to one who was a strong supporter of the Warren Court decisions in the
criminal procedure field, the Burger Court may be somewhat disappointing. But it
strikes me that the civil libertarians who describe the current Court as a disaster
and a threat to the liberties of individuals are allowing their disappointment to blur
their vision.
•

•

•

•

•

•

Equality and the Burger Court

Has the Burger Court departed substantially from the Warren Court's em-
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phasis upon equality? In two instances the Burger Court has refused to extend the

Griffin concept. The first, Ross

v.

Moffit, rejected a proposed expansion of the

right to appointed counsel on appeal. As noted earlier, lhe Warren Court held in

Douglas

v.

California that the equal protection clause guaranteed the indigent

defendant appointed counsel on appeal, but Douglas was limited specifically to
an initial appeal automatically granted to the defendant under state law. In Ross
the Burger Court held that Douglas would not be expanded to require appointed
counsel to assist the indigent in prepa1ing an application for a second-or third
level appellate review that could be granted only at the discretion of the appellate
court.
While the Warren Court might have been willing to extend Douglas to the

Ross settjng, the Ross ruling hardly placed a major limitation on the extension of
the Griffin-Douglas doctrine. The Court's opinion emphasized that the decision of
an appellate court to grant discretionary review rests largely on factors readily
apparent from the record below, and therefore counsel's services are not nearly
as significant in preparing the application for discretionary review as in presenting
the initial appeal, which was treated in Douglas. This emphasis could readily be
used to distinguish various other aspects of counsel's services that are much more
commonly recognized as needed for meaningful access to the judicial process than
"the somewhat arcane art of preparing petitions for discretionary review." Indeed,
if a state supreme court or the United States Supreme Court exercised its discretion
to grant a second- or third-level review, the equal protection clause still would
appear to require that the indigent defendant be provided the assistance of counsel
in presenting that appeal, since there is much greater need for counsel to present
the merits on an appeal than to perform the narrower function involved in Ross.
In United States

v.

MacCollom, the Burger Court also refused to expand the

Griffin analysis, but again the Court's ruling was quite limited. MacCollom held
that it was constitulionally permissible to require as a condition for providing a
free trial transcript on a collateral attack of a conviction, that the trial judge certify
that the defendant's claim is not frivolous. The Court stressed, however, that the
defendant could have obtained a transcript automatically on direct appeal, without
trial court certification. It therefore seems unlikely that MacCollom wi11 have
significance aside from the special situation presented there, in which the defen
dant fails to appeal but subsequently seeks to obtain review by collateral attack.
In contrast to Ross and MacCollom, the Burger Court has approved sub
stantial extensions of the equality theme in other contexts. Most significantly, in

Argersinger

v.

Hamlin, the Court extended the Gideon ruling to require appointed

trial counsel in all misdemeanor cases in which jail sentence is imposed. More
over, the opinion of the Court left open the possibility of further expanding the
right to counsel to encompass some cases in which jail sentences are not imposed.
The practical impact of the Argersinger decision has been greater than Gideon.
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Not only are many more cases presented at the misdemeanor level, but there also
were many more states that had not been appointing counsel in misdemeanor
cases involving jail sentences prior to Argersinger than there were states that had
not been appointing counsel in felony cases before Gideon.
The Burger Court also has approved other extensions of Gideon. In Coleman
v.

Alabama, the Court held that, although the state was not required to provide a

preliminary hearing, it had to provide appointed counsel when such a hearing was
available under state law-even in a jurisdiction that prosecuted by indictment so
that the preliminary hearing bindover was not essential. In Gagnon

v.

Scarpelli,

the Burger Court held that the indigent person also had a right to the assistance of
appointed counsel in various probation and parole revocation proceedings. In

Procunier

v.

MartifjeZ, the Court held that a prisoner could not be kept from

utilizing the legal assistance of law students and paraprofessionals.
Of course, these decisions do not move entirely in one direction. Liberals
may complain that the Burger Court has not gone as far as the Warren Court would
have gone on these issues. Maybe so, but maybe not. For example, in Gagnon,
the Court admittedly did not hold that the indigent had an automatic right to
counsel in all parole and probation revocation proceedings; rather, it held that
the circumstances of the case would control under an analysis similar to the Betts
v.

Brady analysis that the Warren Court rejected in Gideon when it established an

automatic right to appointed counsel at trial. Yet it should be noted that Justices
Brennan and Marshall, who were both stalwarts of the liberal majority of the
Warren Court, accepted the Gagnon standard.
In sum, considering Ross and MacCollom on the one hand, and Argersinger,

Gagnon, and related cases on the other, the civil libertarian critics appear to be on
less than firm ground if their broadside condemnation of the Burger Court's treat
ment of Warren Court precedent is meant to suggest that the Burger Court has
undermined, or even generally refused to extend, the equality theme of the Warren
Court.
•

•

•

•

•

•

The Burger Court Record
Expansionism and the Burger Court
There are at least two areas where the Burger Court has taken the lead from
the Warren Court and adopted constitutional standards that are as protective of
the individual as any the Warren Court would likely have adopted. The Court's
interpretation of the sixth amendment right to counsel is one such area. l have
already noted the Burger Court decisions in Argersinger and Coleman. In addi
tion, there is Faretta

v.

California, where the Court held that the right to counsel

included a supplemental right of the defendant to proceed p r o s e at trial, even if he
has no special legal knowledge or skill.
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Morn"ssey

v.

Brewer is another illustration of a ruling at least equally as

expansive as many of the Warren Court rulings so warmly praised by civil libertar
ians. Indeed, Chief Justice Berger's opinion in Morrissey, in its extension of basic
guarantees beyond the criminal trial, is reminiscent of the Warren Court's ruling
in In re Gault. Morrissey required, as an element of due process, that significant
hearing rights be afforded convicted persons in parole and probation revocation
proceedings. Those hearing rights included not only a final hearing (in which the
individual is entitled to written notice, disclosure of the evidence against him, a
general right of confrontation, and a written statement by the factfinder), but also
a preliminary hearing, which has to be provided promptly and must include a
limited right to confrontation and notice.
AQ,mittedly, in most areas the Burger Court's record does not show as con
sistent an emphasis on expansive interpretations as is found in Morrissey or in the
right-to-counsel cases. Instead, the pattern of the Burger Court decisions tends to
be more like that of the Warren Court in dealing with search and seizure problems;
expansive interpretations of a particular constitutional guarantee have been adopted
in some cases and rejected in others. Nevertheless, a close analysis of its decisions
suggests that the Burger Court, on balance, has tended to favor somewhat expansive
interpretations of constitutional guarantees in areas other than those involving
police investigatory practices. The Court's decisions dealing with the right to a
jury trial, double jeopardy, the right to a speedy trial, and the procedural for
feiture of constitutional objections are ... illustrative of the Court's record in areas
marked by this mixed pattern of decisions.
•

•

•

•

•

•

The Burger Court and Police Practices
So far I have put to one side the Burger Court decisions regulating police
investigatory practices. Undoubtedly these decisions have caused the most concern
among civil libertarian critics of the Court. That concern is not unexpected. The
Warren Court decisions relating to police practices rank high among those Warren
Court decisions most revered by civil libertarians. Moreover, it is in this area that
the Burger Court most clearly has departed from Warren Court precedents. The
question remains, however, whether these Burger Court decisions have, as the
critics suggest, largely eviscerated the Warren Court rulings. I believe that this has
not been the case to date, and even those further cutbacks that are most likely to
be made in the future should not have that effect.
•

•

•

•

•

•

Police Interrogation
The Miranda decision is the most highly publicized of all the Warren Court's
criminal procedure decisions, and it is quite understandable that the civil libertar-
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ians look to its continuing vitality as a bellwether. In
required exclusion of

a

Miranda, the Warren Court

defendant's statement obtained through custodial inter

rogation unless he bad been informed of his constitutional rights and of the pos
sible adverse use of the statement (the so-called

"Miranda warnings") and had

voluntarily waived those rights before making the statement. Although the value of
the

Miranda ruling in effectively protecting the suspect's self-inclimination privilege

is debatable, the decision has a symbolic quality that extends far beyond its practi
cal impact upon police interrogation methods.
As noted previously, a major element of the

Miranda decision-the equal

treatment of the indigent-has not suffered at the hands of the Burger Court.
Other aspects of the decision have, perhaps, been treated less well. Yet, the fact
remaJ.ns that

Miranda still is the law of the land. Moreover, while its ramifications

arguably have been narrowed, the Court has not cast doubt upon its basic premise
that the defendant's right against self-incrimination applies to police custodial
interrogation and not just to judicial compulsion of testimony by the threat of
contempt. The Burger Court decisions most frequently noted by critics as under
mining the

Miranda ruling-Harris

Mosley, and Oregon

v.

v.

New Yark, Michigan

v.

Tucker, Michigan

v.

Mathiason-al] have accepted that basic assumption.

Harris permitted the use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda to
impeach the defendant's trial testimony. In the

Tucker case, although the Court

dealt with a special situation relating to retroactive application of

Miranda, it

clearly raised the possibility that the testimony of "tainted witnesses"-i.e., wit
nesses who were discovered because of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda
-would not be excluded from evidence. In the Mosley decision, the Court held that
a second interrogation session that occurred after a suspect initially refused to make
a statement did not violate

Miranda under the facts of that case. In the recent

Mathiason case, the Court noted that not all interrogation conducted in a police
station is necessarily "custodial interrogation" (the only type of questioning
subject

toMiranda).

While none of these cases adopted the expansive view of
civil libertarians wou]d have preferred, it also is true that
perhaps even

Miranda that the

Tucker, Mathiason, and

Mosley did not significantly detract from the basic Miranda ruling.

The Court's conclusion in

Mathiason that the suspect there had not been in "cus

tody" might well have been reached by the members of the

Miranda majority

themselves. The suspect voluntarily came to the police station after a police officer
requested that they meet; he was immediately informed that he was not under
arrest; and he was allowed to leave following the close of the interview, even
though he admitted committing the crime. While Justice Marshall dissented, his
major point was that the Court should go beyond the custodial interrogation
situation covered in Miranda and reach other interrogation situations as well.

Tucker , on the facts presented, also can be squared with Miranda . The issue
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before

the Court concerned the application of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree

doctrine to the testimony of a witness discovered as a result of police interrogation
that had violated the Miranda requirements, but had been conducted before the

Miranda case was decided. The Court held that, in light of the special problems
raised by the application of Miranda to pre-Miranda interrogations, it was inap
propriate to expand the impact of retroactive application by excluding the witness'
testimony as well as the defendant's statement. However, language in Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion suggests that the Burger Court might not extend
the poisoned-fruits doctrine to the tainted witness even where retroactive appli
cation is not involved. Assuming the Court eventually takes that position, would it
necessarily be inconsistent with Miranda, especially where the police interrogation
was not ·(lesigned specifically to obtain the names of witnesses? Some very "liberal"
judges have acknowledged that the extension of the poisoned-fruits doctrine to
subsequently discovered witnesses who willingly cooperate with the police is at
least a very difficult question. While the witness may have been found through the
defendant's statement, the possibility always exists that he might otherwise have
come to the attention of the police if they had reached the point of methodically
tracking down all persons who had even the remotest link to the victim of the
accused. Indeed, even where the witness could not have been found by the most
intensive investigation, the possibility remains that the witness eventually might
have come forward on his own, perhaps in response to a general police request for
assistance.

Mosley is similar to Tucker in that the decision was based on a rather unusual
situation. The Court in Mosley upheld a second interrogation session after the
defendant initially had refused to waive his rights and speak with officers. In
rejecting the defendant's claim that Miranda prohibited a second attempt to obtain
his waiver, the Court stressed the particular facts surrounding the second inter
rogation in Mosley. The second interrogation related to a separate crime and was
inHiated by an officer who apparently had not been aware of the defendant's
initial refusal to cooperate. The officer had given complete Miranda warnings at
the outset of the second session, and the defendant in no way indicated that he
did not want to discuss the second crime. Admittedly, Justice White, in a con
curring opinion, advanced an interpretation of Miranda that generally would
allow repeated attempts to interrogate following an initial refusal, but his opinion
was not joined by any of the other justices.
Unlike Mosley, Tucker, or Mathiason, Harris

v.

New York, the impeachment

case, clearly did impose a significant limit upon the impact of Miranda . From the
prosecutor's viewpoint, the consequences of a Miranda violation may be softened
considerably by the ability to use the defendant's statement for impeachment
purposes. A major value in obtaining a statement from a defendant, even where
the defendant does not acknowledge commission of the offense, is the discovery
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provided regarding the defendant's likely trial testimony. While the defendant
may shift somewhat from the explanation in his statement, the statement's avail
ability for impeachment should keep the defendant's testimony close to that
original explanation. Of course, if the statement is incriminating, then the Harris
ruling is likely to have even more value from the prosecution's viewpoint. It may
place the defendant in a position where he will be forced to take the chance in
volved in not testifying at all. If he takes the stand, the statement surely will be
damaging notwithstanding the judge's admonition to the jury that they can con
sider the incriminating admissions only as to impeachment and not as substantive
evidence.

Harris thus may be quite significant from the prosecutor's point of view.
It is the police, however, who are largely responsible for determining how Miranda
will be applied, and their immediate objectives focus more on justifying a decision
to go forward with the prosecution than on the trial techniques eventually used to
win the case. An admissible incriminating statement is of immense value in building
the prima facie case needed to gain approval of the prosecution. A statement
obtained in violation of Miranda, on the other hand, is likely to be given very
little weight in determining whether a prosecution should be carried forward. The
primary emphasis at this point must be on the adequacy of the prima facie case
needed to get the case to the jury, not on certain tactical advantages that may be
available if the defendant is forced to present a defense. Thus, from the police
viewpoint, Harris does not substantially alter the impact of a Miranda violation.
It thus seems likely that, insofar as police compliance with Miranda is deter
mined by the officer's calculated evaluation of the costs of violation, Harris should
not influence significantly the officer's decision. Of course, Harris could have a
substantial impact if it led prosecutors and others involved in police training pro
grams to place less emphasis on compliance with Miranda, since police adherence
to Miranda probably is influenced far more by the general thrust of that training
than by calculated cost-benefit evaluations made by officers in individual cases.
I am not aware, however, of any such change in training programs, and the con
tinuing symbolic and practical significance of Miranda makes it most unlikely
that Harris alone would encourage such a change.
•

•

•

•

•

•

Search and Seizure
Civil libertarians also have expressed considerable concern over the Burger
Court's treatment of the fourth amendment. Indeed, the Court's decisions relating
to the constitutionality of searches and seizures probably have been more sharply
criticized than any other group of decisions involving the regulation of police
practices. That criticism has centered primarily upon two sets of decisions, one
defining the substantive standards for determining the reasonableness of a search
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or arrest and the other defining the scope of the exclusionary rule adopted in

Mapp

v.

Ohio.

The resonableness of a search or arrest. In evaluating the Burger Court deci
sions dealing with the substantive standards for searches and seizures, it should
be recalled that the Warren Court decisions in this area were varied in approach.
On the one hand, the Warren Court refused to adopt expansive interpretations of
the fourth amendment in several major decisions. In Warden

v.

Hayden, for ex

ample, the Court rejected the long-standing interpretation of the fourth amend
ment as prohibiting searches for "mere evidence." In Terry

v.

Ohio, the Court

rejected the contention that frisks must be justified by probable cause. Ker

v.

California recognized that no-knock entry was permissible where needed to pre
vent thc, likely destruction of evidence. In McCray

v.

Illinois, the Court rejected

a defense contention that, in challenging the probable cause allegedly supporting
the search, it had the right to discover the name of the anonymous tipster who
furnished information that led to the search. On the other hand, there were various
decisions in which the Warren Court did adopt new, more rigorous standards for
acceptable searches. Several cases rejected earlier opinions that had deemphasized
the need for warrant authorization of a search whenever practicable. Most notably,

Chime!

v.

California limited the permissible scope of a warrantless search incident

to an arrest and thereby narrowed one of the most significant exceptions to the
warrant requirement. At the same time, Spinelli

v.

United States applied stringent

standards to the affidavit submitted on an application for a search warrant, thereby
ensuring that the magistrate had an adequate factual foundation for determining
whether to grant a warrant.
The Burger Court has on several occasions likewise adopted expansive interpretations of the fourth amendment. Thus, United States

v.

United States District

Court held unconstitutional warrantless electronic surveillance of a domestic
group accused of violence against the government. The Court held that the sub
stantial governmental interest in a domestic security investigation could not over
ride the traditional fourth amendment standards requiring warrant authorization
of electronic surveillance. In Gerstein

v.

Pugh, the Court required alteration of the

pretrial practice in many states by holding that the fourth amendment required
a prompt post-arrest review of probable cause by a magistrate where an arrest was
made without

a

warrant and the arrestee was still in custody or subject to extended

restraint. Coolidge

v.

New Hampshire held invalid a rather unusual state practice

that permitted a state attorney general to serve as a magistrate for the purpose of
issuing a search warrant.
Decisions such as District Court, Gerstein, and Coolidge do not reflect the
general trend, however. Viewed as a whole, Burger Court decisions judging the
reasonableness of searches and seizures generally have refused to adopt new, more
rigorous fourth amendment standards. Indeed, as critics have noted, the Burger
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Court decisions tend to grant the police more leeway than did the Warren Court
decisions. The difference in the positions of the two Courts is not nearly as sub
stantial, however, as the sharp criticism of the current Court might suggest.
In several major areas of search and seizure, it is far from certain that the
often-criticized Burger Court decisions reach a conclusion contra1y to that which
the Warren Court might have reached. Thus, the Burger Court's decision upholding
the issuance of a search warrant in United States
from the Warren Court ruling in Spinelli

v.

v.

Harris arguably may depart

United States, but it should be noted

that Justice White, who was one of the five Justices in the majority in Spinelli,
also joined Harris. The divergence between the two rulings certainly is not exten
sive, and Harris arguably may be viewed as more consistent with the earlier Warren
Court decision in Draper v. United States.
Similarly, while the Burger Court decisions dealing with probable-cause
searches of automobiles arguably have failed to carry forward the Chime! em
phasis upon obtaining warrant authorization whenever practicable, it seems likely
that the Warren Court also would have viewed the Chime! rationale as inapplicable
to most automobile searches. The leading Burger Court decision limiting the ap
plicability of that rationale for automobile searches, Chambers

v.

Maroney, almost

certainly would have been accepted by the Warren Court. Justice Stewart, who
wrote Chime!, and Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, who had joined the
Chime! opinion, all joined the Court's opinion in Chambers. They apparently had

no difficulty with Chambers' extension of the "moving vehicle" exception to the
warrent requirement (an exception that Chime! had not challenged) to uphold the
warrantless search of an automobile conducted after the driver had been arrested
and the automobile had been removed to the police station. Only Justice Harlan
contended that such an extension was improper since temporary immobilization
of the car would afford police ample opportunity to obtain a warrant before
beginning their search.
Of course, Chambers, in turn, served as the foundation for Cardwell v. Lewis
and Texas

v.

White, two cases that arguably further expanded the scope of the

moving vehicle exception. Cardwell, in particular, may have undercut the Court's
analysis in Coolidge

v.

New Hampshire, which suggested that the Chambers excep

tion was limited to cases involving an unanticipated stopping of an automobile.
but Coolidge, it must be remembered, was not a Warren Court decision but rather
was a 1971 decision in which Justice Stewart's plurality opinion was supported
by only three other Justices. Admittedly, Justice Stewart's opinion in Coolidge
might have received majority support from the Warren Court of the 1 962-1969
period, but, even under that assumption, Cardwell is the only one of the auto
mobile search cases that clearly would have been decided differently by the Warren
Court. Certainly, the Cardwell decision standing alone cannot be viewed as a
dramatic departure from the Warren Court's position in Chime!, once Chambers
is accepted as a valid exception to that position.
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The Burger Court's decision in Adams

v.

Williams presents similar difficulties

in assessing its relationship to Warren Court precedent. Adams extended the Terry
v.

Ohio ruling on frisks to uphold forcible stops based on reasonable suspicion.

Moreover, it did so where the individual's suspicious activity related solely to
possessory offenses (narcotics and weapon possession), rather than to a forth
coming crime of violence as was suspected in Terry. Adams also held that the
reasonable suspicion needed for a stop and frisk had been established when a
person known to the officer approached the policeman on the street and reported
the possessory offense but did not provide further corroboration. Notwithstanding
the vigorous dissents of Justice Douglas (who had also dissented in Terry) and
Justices Brennan and Marshall (who had joined Terry), it is certainly arguable
that a �arren Court majority would have agreed with Adams. Justices Stewart
and White, who joined Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Terry, also joined in the

Adams decision, and the Adams case fits sufficiently within the basic rationale
advanced in Terry to suggest that the remainder of the Terry majority might
have reached a similar result. Although the Terry opinion did not rule on forcible
stops, it posed an operating procedure that certainly suggested their validity.
Similarly, the Terry rationale is in no way inconsistent with basing reasonable
suspicion on information supplied by third persons without substantial corrob
oration by the officer's own observations.
More clear-cut deviations from the philosophy of the Warren Court arguably
are found in several recent cases that permitted searches without requiring probable
cause. In South Dakota

v.

Opperman, the Court upheld warrantless inventory

searches of impounded automobiles. Opperman was based on a Warren Court
precedent, Cooper

v.

California, but it is most unlikely that the Warren Court

would have so extended Cooper. In United States

v.

Robinson and Gustafson

v.

Florida, the Burger Court upheld full searches of the person incident to a traffic
arrest. Arguably, the Warren Court would have agreed with Justice Marshall's
dissent in Robinson, which contended that no more than a frisk for weapons
should be permitted since the officer clearly cannot expect to find evidence of
the traffic offense on the person of the arrestee. Here again, however, the majority's
position had substantial foundation in earlier opinions. Indeed, the majority opin
ions in Robinson and Gustafson may reflect a lesson suggested in several Warren
Court opinions-the need for flat, simple rules that can easily be applied by police
officers. Arguably, the Warren Court would have found such an approach inap
propriate where used to extend police authority, but it should be noted that
Justice Stewart, who wrote Katz and Chime/, two of the leading "liberal" search·
and-seizure opinions of the Warren Court, also joined the Robinson majority
and concurred in the result in Gustafson.
Justice Stewart also wrote for the majority in Schneckloth

v.

Bustamante,

another case that arguably deviates from the policy of the Warren Court through
its generous interpretation of a doctrine (search by consent) that validates searches
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without probable cause. Schneckloth ruled that, in establishing voluntary consent
to a search following a street stop, the prosecution need not show that the in
dividual had been made aware of his right to refuse to consent. The Warren Court
presumably would have imposed a heavier burden on the prosecution, as urged in
the dissenting opinions of Justices Marshall and Brennan.
Assuming that the decisions in Opperman, Robinson, Gustafson, and Schneck

loth do depart from the approach of the Warren Court, how significant are these
decisions in altering the protection of privacy afforded by the fourth amendment?
Although all four permit searches without probable cause, they might not substan
tially broaden the search authority of the police beyond that which the Warren
Court would have accepted. In Robinson and Gustafson, for example, it must be
remembered that the dissenters would have permitted an automatic frisk of the
,

arrested person, although not a full search. Moreover, as the dissenters also acknowledged, if the arrestee did not obtain his prompt release on station-house
bail, he would have been subjected to an inventory search of his person (although
the dissenters would not have permitted an inventory search so thorough as to
examine the contents of the cigarette package that contained the contraband
seized in Robinson). Finally, it also should be noted that Robinson and Gustafson
apply only where the traffic stop involves a full-custody arrest, and Justice Stew
art's concurring opinion in Gustafson leaves open the possibility that the fourth
amendment might not permit full-custody arrests for all traffic violations.
The potential impact of Opperman is similarly limited by issues left open in
the majority opinion. The inventory search involved there extended only to the
interior of the automobile and an unlocked glove compartment. It is uncertain
whether the same standard would be applied to a locked glove compartment or
trunk. Although the car in Opperman was itself locked, it generally is much easier
for someone to break into a locked car than into a locked trunk or glove compart
ment, and the police might have greater justification for removing all valuables
from those areas that are readily accessible once the door locks are bypassed.
Like Robinson and Gustafson, the Schneckloth ruling on consent searches
also was based upon a "street situation"-the noncustodial, on-the-street stop of
an automobile. The Schneckloth majority held that, in such a situation, the pro
secution does not have to establish that a driver, in granting his consent, was aware
that he had a right to refuse the officer's request to search the car. In particular,
the majority ruled that the police need not give warnings similar to those required
by Miranda before requesting consent. It should be noted that the majority opinion
does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of showing that the consent was
voluntary. Neither does it render the driver's knowledge an irrelevant factor in
determining voluntariness. The dissents by Justices Brennan and Marshall rejected
the contention that the driver's awareness of the right to refuse to permit the search
could be assumed, but, at the same time, neither dissent would have required that
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the police necessarily inform the driver of his right to refuse to give consent. The
practical significance of the distinction between this position and that of the
majority is difficult to determine. It is not clear, for example, whether the dis
senters would permit the prosecution to establish knowledge by showing simply
that the officer's phrasing of the request in itself suggested a right to refuse (e. g. ,
where the officer said, "Will you give me your permission to search?").
No doubt, when decisions like Opperman , Robinson, and Scheckloth are
added to decisions like Cardwell, the overall thrust of the Burger Court decisions
is to grant the police far more flexibility than a civil libertarian is likely to view as
acceptable. Yet the Court's approach is not so substantially different from that
taken in many Warren Court decisions as to be characterized as a major departure
from the, Warren Court's standard. Admittedly, there is a more substantial de
parture when the comparison is limited to the position taken by Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Fortas, and Goldberg. But, for
much of the Warren period, n o more than four of these Justices sat together, and
they could not count on the ready support of Justice Black who often opposed
an expansionist view of the fourth amendment. As a result, the Warren Court
decisions in this area reflected a varied approach that was perhaps more "con
servative" than its approach in other areas. The Burger Court's fourth amendment
decisions accordingly come closer in approach to the Warren Court rulings than
do the decisions involving other police practices, where the addition of Justice
Black gave the Warren Court majority greater leeway.
The sc ope of the exclusionary rule. As noted above, the civil libertarian

critics also have expressed concern as to the Burger Court's treatment of a second
aspect of the fourth amendment, the application of the Mapp v. Ohio exclusionary
rule. So far, the Burger Court has done ve1y little to restrict the Mapp ruling itself,
which required the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence only at the
criminal trial. Indeed, in Brown

v.

fllinois, the Court specifically rejected an in

vitation to limit sharply the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, which determines
the reach of the exclusionary rule in the trial setting. In Brown, the Court rejected
the contention that the giving of the Miran da warnings automatically purged the
taint of an illegal arrest, thereby permitting the admissibility of any subsequent
confession of the arrestee to be judged without regard to the illegal arrest. The
Court also made clear that Won g Sun

v.

United States, a Warren Court decision

first holding an incriminating statement inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal
arrest, was not limited to the facts of the case, which involved a statement made
almost contemporaneously with the arrest.
On the other side, the Burger Court has rejected attempts to extend the
exclusionary rule outside of the criminal trial, and it has overturned Warren Court
precedent permitting a habeas corpus challenge to a conviction resulting from a
trial in which illegally seized evidence was admitted. In United States

v.

Calandra,
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the Court held that the Mapp rule did not extend to grand jury proceedings, and
a witness therefore could not object to grand jury questioning based on information
obtained through a fourth amendment violation. While Justices Marshall, Brennan,
and Douglas dissented, it is not clear that the majorlty's position would have been
rejected by the Warren Court. That Court had accepted in other contexts Justice
Black's view that the Court should be most reluctant to impose new legal limita
tions on grand jury proceedings since such limitations tend to cause delay and
impede the grand jury's performance as a safeguard against unjust prosecutions.
In United States

v.

Janis, the Burger Court held that the exclusionary rule

did not apply to an IRS assessment proceeding (a civil action) where the illegal
search had been conducted by local police. Here, as Justice Stewart's dissent
indicates, it is very likely that the Warren Court would have reached a different
result.

A

major function of the exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional

searches by denying police the use of illegally seized evidence, and the Janis ruling
arguably might offer a counter-incentive to engage in such searches. However,

Janis certainly should pr9duce no more than a slight dent in the deterrent impact
of the rule, since the primary concern of police remains the obtaining of criminal
convictions, not possible IRS assessments.
A similar conclusion might be advanced with regard to Stone

v.

Powell. Here

the Court clearly narrowed the exclusionary rule's scope but still left substantially
intact its general effectiveness as a deterrent device. Stone held that, for all practical
purposes, a fou rth amendment objection could not be utilized to challenge col
laterally a state conviction in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The majority
ruled that a federal court could not consider a habeas claim that unconstitutionally
seized evidence was used at the petitioner's trial unless the petitioner had not
been afforded an opportunity for "full and fair litigation" of his claim in the
state courts. Stone rejected several Warren Court decisions that had considered
fou rth amendment claims on habeas petitions. Moreover, the Stone ruling arguably
was inconsistent with the reasoning, though not the holding, of Fay

v.

Noia, one of

the most celebrated opinions of the Warren era. Although Fay dealt with a col
lateral challenge to a conviction based on a coereced confession, the Fay opinion
certainly suggested that federal habeas corpus should be available to challenge
collaterally a state conviction on any constitutional error.
The Burger Court obviously is concerned about the sharp increase in habeas
petitions since Fay and is seeking to restrict the scope of that opinion. Like Stone,

Francis

v.

Henderson, discussed earlier, also narrowed the scope of collateral

attack. From a civil libertarian viewpoint, the significance of decisions like Francis
and Stone depends in large part on the importance of federal habeas review in
achieving full recognition of the particular constitutional right in question. With
respect to Stone and the fourth amendment, that significance should relate primar
ily to the degree to which federal habeas review strengthens the deterrent impact
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of the exclusionary rule beyond the deterrence that flows from the rule's appli
cation in the state courts. While people may disagree as to the precise significance
of such federal habeas reinforcement, it surely has a comparatively minor bearing
upon the rule's overall effectiveness as a deterrent.
The elimination of a federal collateral challenge based on the fourth amend
ment hardly is significant enough to suggest to police that the fourth amendment
can be ignored. The primary focus of the police is on the everyday application
of the exclusionary sanction by state courts. Of course, if the elimination of federal
collateral attack led state trial courts to eviscerate fourth amendment standards,
that stance probably would lead police, in turn, to pay considerably less attention
to the fourth amendment. It seems most unlikely, however, that the

Stone decision

will encourage many state trial courts to vitiate the fourth amendment. The limited
number of federal habeas reversals of state convictions suggests that a state trial
judge with an inclination to ignore the fourth amendment is likely to be concerned
primarily with reversal by a state appellate court, not by a federal habeas court.
And the restraining influence of state appellate review should remain substantially
intact notwithstanding

Stone. Admittedly, Stone may have some impact upon

those state appellate courts that have "liberalized" their views to fit that of the
federal circuit court of appeals in their area, but such shifts in position are likely
to be far too subtle to have any dramatic impact on trial court (or police) practices.
Taken together, the impact of Calandra,
to be roughly similar to the impact of Mosley,

Janis, and Stone upon Mapp appears

Tucker, andMathiason upon Miranda:

while the Burger Court has refused to extend the

Mapp ruling, neither has it cut

back significantly upon the scope of that ruling. Indeed, as with Miranda, the in
tensity of civil libertarian criticism probably relates less to what the Court has
done with the

Mapp decision than to what the critics fear it will do in the future.

Chief Justice Burger has suggested that perhaps Mapp simply should be overruled.
He appears to stand alone, however, in suggesting total abandonment of the ex
clusionary rule. A more likely possibility is the modification of Mapp suggested by
Justice White in

Stone. There, Justice White urged that unconstitutionally seized

evidence need not be excluded where the officer who seized the evidence was
,,
"acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing laws
and had "reasonable grounds for [that]

belief." While H appears that Justice

White may have the support of three other Justices for adopting this modification

the presence of the additional vote needed for a majolity opinion is highly specu
lative. Let us assume, however, that Justice White's view does prevail. From the
viewpoint of the civil libertarian, how much will have been lost? I suggest that the
wound will be primarily to the civil libertarian's pride, not to the primary function
of the exclusionary rule.
Of course, if one views the exclusion of evidence as an appropriate personal
remedy for the person whose privacy has been invaded by an illegal search, then
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Justice White's app roach has the basic defect of leaving some injured defendants
without a remedy. But the Court traditionally has justified the exclusionary rule
on two other rationales. Those rationales are the deterrence theory noted above
and the theory that exclusion is necessary to maintain "the imperative of judicial
integrity"-that courts cannot, consistent with their duty to uphold the Constitu
tion, condone constitutional violations by permitting the fruits of those violations
to serve as the basis for criminal convictions. When the exclusionary rule is viewed
in light of these theories, Justice White's proposal does not seriously undermine

the rule's basic functions, although it certainly does not strengthen the rule.
First, accepting arguendo the judicial-integrity rationale, Justice White's
proposed modification would hardly place the Court in a more precarious position
in maintaining that integrity than do various current rulings that also allow un
constitutionally seized evidence to be used in judicial proceedings. Consider, for
example, the Warren Court ruling in Alderman

v.

United States, which held that a

defendant lacks standing to object to the admission of evidence unconstitutionally
seized from a third person. Under Walder

v.

United States, an early Warren Court

opinion, unconstitutionally seized evidence also could be used under some cir
cumstances for impeachment purposes. If the trial court's failure to exclude il
legally seized evidence threatens its integrity by creating the "taint of [judicial]
partnership in official lawlessness ," it does so as readily under Alderman and
Walder as under Justice White's proposed modification of Mapp . Indeed, that
proposal, unlike Alderman, would at least draw distinctions according to the type
of illegality and ensure condemnation of purposeful police illegality.
The impact of Justice White's proposed modification upon the deterrent
function of the exclusionary rule is more troublesome. As even the most ardent
supporters of the Warren Court acknowledge, the exclusionary rule has obvious
limits as an effective deterrent device. The key to the rule's effectiveness as a
deterrent lies, I believe, in the impetus it has provided to police training programs
that make officers aware of the limits imposed by the fourth amendment and
emphasize the need to operate within those limits. Justice White's exclusionary
standard is not likely to result in the elimination of such programs, which are now
viewed as an important aspect of police professionalism. Neither is it likely to
alter the tenor of those programs; the possibility that illegally obtained evidence
may be admitted in borderline cases is unlikely to encourage police instructors
to pay less attention to fourth amendment limitations. Finally, Justice White's
proposal should not encourage officers to pay less attention to what they are
,
taught, as the requirement that the officer act in "good faith , is inconsistent
with closing one's mind to the possibility of illegality.
I have considered so far the deterrent impact o f the exclusionary rule only
insofar as it serves what Professor Andenaes describes as a "general preventive
effect." Arguably, the exclusionary rule also may have a significant impact as an
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immediate threat that deters illegal conduct in a particular case. Although we
have come to place less reliance on special deterrence as a justification for imposing
criminal sanctions, perhaps the Benthamite model makes sense as applied to the
exclusionary rule, since the officer presumably operates in a less emotional, more
rational fashion than most criminal offenders. Still, assuming that the rule does
have a "special deterrence" effect, Justice White's proposed modification of the
rule should not substantially alter that impact in those instances where it is most
likely to be significant.
Where the officer recognizes that a search is clearly illegal, the special deter
rence effect should not be diluted, since the officer also should recognize that the
fruits of the search will be excluded under Justice White's proposal. The proposal
is far more likely to have a bearing on those cases in which the officer views the
legality of the search as a close question. In such a borderline case, the officer
might proceed with the search on the ground that there is a good chance that the
evidence will be admitted under Justice White's standard even if the search eventu
ally is found to be illegal. Whether officers are likely to make such careful calcu
lations is questionable. But assuming they do, will the officer's decision to proceed
with the search in such borderline cases constitute a substantial change from cur
rent behavior? Even under the current Mapp rule, are not officers likely to pro
ceed in cases they recognize as borderline, particularly where they are concerned
that the evidence may not be available for seizure by the time they cure any poten
tial legal difficulties? If the officer is astute enough to recognize the borderline
nature of the search, he also should be astute enough to know that in a truly bord
erline case the issue of illegality of the search is likely to be compromised in the
plea negotiation process, so that some prosecutorial benefit will be obtained from
the search in any event.
Justice Brennan has raised still another objection to Justice White's approach:
that it could retard the development of search and seizure law. In close cases,
Justice Brennan suggests, the state and federal courts will not bother to decide
whether the search was illegal, but simply will admit the evidence on the basis of
the officer's good-faith effort supported by his reasonable belief as to the validity
of the search. It is not clear, however, that Justice White's proposal would permit
a court to follow that approach in deciding fourth amendment issues. The trial
court readily could be required to determine whether there was, in fact, a violation
of the fourth amendment before it begins to examine the officer's good faith.
Justice White's approach, like the American Law Institute's similar proposal for
modifying Mapp , apparently requires consideration of the "extent of [the officer's]
deviation from lawful conduct"; the Court could readily hold that, to evalutate
that factor, the trial court initially must determine how the requirements of the
fourth amendment apply to the case before it.
In sum, the Burger Court has not yet modified Mapp as applied to the crimi-
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nal trial. Moreover, if it should do so, the most likely modification-Justice White's
approach-can hardly be described as a threat to the very heart of the rule.
Looking to the area of police practices as a whole, the Burger Court decisions
certainly provide a more substantial basis for civil libertarian criticism than the
Court's decisions in other areas of criminal procedure. Yet, even in this area, when
one considers decisions such as Gerstein, United States

v.

United States District

Court, and Brewer and notes the limited scope of decisions such as Mosley and
Schneckloth, it seems to be stretching the record to say that the Court has followed
a definite pattern of "looking at defendants' rights as narrowly as possible without
overruling past decisions ." Certainly, statements of utter despair concerning the
removal of constitutional restrain ts upon police can hardly be justified by the
Court'� decisions to date. Much of that despair undoubtedly relates to antici
pated decisions, but here again, based on reasonable expectations, the critics'
concerns appear overstated . While it remains possible that the current majority
will overrule Miranda and Mapp, the Court's recent decisjons, and the opinions
of the individual Justices, suggest an approach more likely to be directed toward
modifications that will not undermine the basic strength of either Miranda or Mapp.
THE BURGER COURT IMAGE
Where then does thls analysis leave us when we review the record of the
Burger Court as a whole? Even the most zealous civil libertarian, I suggest,

can

not properly characterize the Court's decisions as reflecting an absolute, or even
consistent, opposition to an expansionist interpretation of the Bill of Rights'
guarantees. Neither can the Court properly be charged with having destroyed,
or even having seriously threatened to destroy, the basic legacy of the Warren
Court. The selective incorporation doctrine and the concept of equal treatment
of the indigent remain firmly implanted in the governing law. Similarly, in deter
mining the scope of individual Bill of Rights' guarantees, the Court has followed
the expansionist tendencies of the Warren Court in several areas. Decisions like

Argersinger, Faretta, Morrissey, Ashe, Waller, and Taylor are fully in keeping
with the Warren Court tradition. In other areas, the Court's decisions may not
have gone as far as the Warren Court would have gone, but they are not far be
hind. The Barker decision, for example, may not be as far-reaching as the civil
libertarians would have liked, but it has put pressure on the states to make sub
stantial legislative efforts to guarantee a speedy trial to defendants.
Of course, the Burger Court decisions do not move entirely in one direction.
There are various cases in which expansionist interpretations have been rejected,
and in the area of police practices the Burger Court clearly seems intent upon
cutting back upon, though not necessarily overruling, some of the key Warren
Court decisions. Yet, taken as a whole, the Burger Court record certainly does not
suggest that the Court values effective law enforcement over all else. Indeed, its
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decisions consistently reject an approach that would permit the state to override
the interests of the accused whenever such action could be supported by a rational
state interest. A Court that started from Judge Learned Hand's assumptions that
"the accused has every advantage" at trial and that the primary defect in the
current process is the "archaic formalism and watery sentiment that obstructs,
delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime" surely would have rejected the
defense claims recognized in such cases as Wardius, Faretta, and Brooks.
The civil libertarian critics also must take into account the fact that the
issues presented to the Burger Court have a somewhat different quality than many
of the issues presented to the Warren Court. Although the Warren Court had to
treat close questions in several of its most prominent decisions, it also dealt with
a signifieant number of cases that were rather easily resolved once it was decided
that the particular constitutional provision applied to the states through the four
teenth amendment. The Burger Court has not had the opportunity to "bolster"
its record in the protection of civil liberties with many cases like Pointer v. Texas,

Duncan

v.

Louisiana, Klopfer

v.

North Carolina, and Benton

v.

Maryland. Of

course, even if one discounts such decisions, the remaining Warren Court decisions
obviously show a more substantial leaning toward an expansive interpretation
of individual safeguards than do the Burger Court decisions, particularly in the
area of police practices. But the weakness in the Burger Court's record from a
civil libertarian's point of view may exist only as compared with the performance
of the Warren Court. Even there, the current Court's record is quite comparable
to the record of the Warren Court before 1962, when Justice Goldberg replaced
Justice Frankfurter. The Burger Court certainly has made far greater advances
in protecting the interests of the accused than were made by the Vinson Court,
even when appropriate weight is given to the narrow and scarce precedents upon
which the Vinson Court could build. Moreover, while civil libertarians have called
our attention to several state courts that recently have imposed more rigorous
limitations on police or prosecutors pursuant to state constitutions, the fact re
mains that the Burger Court is ahead of most state courts in protecting civil liberties,
as illustrated by the significant change in state practice required by decisions like

Argersinger, Ashe, Waller, and Morrissey.
There remains the contention that the harsh civil libertarian criticism of the
Burger Court is justified not so much by what the Court has done, but by what it
has said. Even when defense claims are upheld by the Burger Court, it is argued,
the opinions raise questions that encourage state court evasion of the Court's own
decisions; considerations are balanced so neatly that each case appears limited
to its facts; and doubts never before entertained are expressed about the future
course of precedent. These qualities undoubtedly are found in several of the Court's
leading opinions, but almost all of those are opinions dealing with Mapp, Miranda,
and Fay . Other opinions, such as Argersinger and Morrissey, clearly look toward
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further extension of constitutional guarantees. Moreover, in several cases, the
prospect of future rejection of Warren Court decisions has been stressed primarily
by dissents, usually by Justice Brennan, predicting the Court's eventual expansion
of a minor exception to a Warren Court ruling into a total rejection of the earlier
precedent. Civil libertarians and lower courts must recognize that Justice Brennan's
cries of "wolf' have come forth so frequently that some Justices in the majority
apparently have decided simply to ignore them. The absence of a response does
not necessarily mean that Justice Brennan is accurately predicting the majority's
intentions.
Of course, while the style of the Burger Court opinions on the whole is not
negative, it also is not very positive. Opinions that openly balance interests on
both sides and rely upon multifaceted standards do not "glorify" individual rights
or even boldly calJ to the public attention major civil liberties issues. In this respect,
the Burger Court lags far behind the Warren Court. The Warren Court opinions
brought to the attention of the American people the important lesson that the
observance of procedural safeguards is a significant indicator of the strength of
our liberty. They spoke clearly and strongly on the need to keep law enforcement
itself under the rule of law. As a result, the legitimacy of law enforcement practices
became a subject of public debate rather than a concern only to the readers of

Commentary or Harpers.
The Burger Court opinions, while obviously less helpful from the viewpoint
of civil libertarians, still are not without potential value for their cause. Today,
the public appears to be far more concerned about controlling crime than pro
tecting the rights of suspects. Polls suggest that many people favor measures de
signed to "crack down" on crime, including some measures that would limit the
rights of the accused. The Burger Court opinions suggesting possible future restric
tions of Mapp or Miranda have been used by supporters of such conservative
measures to promote their public acceptance. But neither the record of the Court
nor the tenor of its majority opinions, taken as a whole, really supports a broad
movement towards restricting the protections afforded the accused. Many civil
libertarians might be well advised to examine the current Court's record care
fully and to push aside the fact that Richard Nixon appointed four members
of the current court. If they did so, they might find that their true interests lie
in dropping their wholesale attacks on the Burger Court and in attempting instead
to attract public attention to the vadous decisions of that Court that stress the
continuing need to safeguard the basic rights of the accused.

